| Titre : | Intrusion Detection for Wireless Sensor Networks by Game Theory |
| Auteurs : | NESRINE GUESBAYA, Auteur ; Djemaa Boukhlouf, Directeur de thèse |
| Type de document : | Monographie imprimée |
| Editeur : | Biskra [Algérie] : Faculté des Sciences Exactes et des Sciences de la Nature et de la Vie, Université Mohamed Khider, 2020 |
| Format : | 1 vol. (99 p.) / ill. / 29 cm |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Mots-clés: | WSN,security,IDS,AODV,blackhole attack,AODV-GT. |
| Résumé : |
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consist of a large number of tiny, spatially distributed, and autonomous devices, called sensor nodes. The latter are equipped with sensing, computation, and wireless communications capabilities.In view of the compelling applications in both military and civilian fields, WSNs have attracted an unprecedented focus on their easy configuration and low cost. Due to the openness of wireless media and constrained resources of WSNs, several attacks such as black hole attack may be easily applied on conventional routing protocols used in WSNs and compromise the security of networks. However, the security of these networks is critical.Especially secure routing is important given the fact that potential attackers aim to disrupt the appropriate operation of the routing protocol within a WSN.In our project, we propose a game theoretic approach called AODV-GT (AODV-Game Theoretic) and we integrate this into the reactive Ad hoc Ondemand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol to provide defense against blackhole attack. In our model, the interaction between potential attackers and defenders is formulated as a two-player non-cooperative non-zero sum game. Moreover, our simulation were implemented using the network simulator ns-2. Finally, AODV-GT outperforms AODV in terms of malicious
dropped packets when blackhole node exists within the WSN. |
| Sommaire : |
General Introduction 1
I Background 3 1 Security of Wireless Sensor Networks 4 1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.1.1 Sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.1.2 Structure of a Sensor Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.1.3 Wireless Sensor Network Architecture . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.1.4 Network Topologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.2 WSN Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.2.1 Wearable Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.2.2 Car and Building Automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.2.3 Smart Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.2.4 Smart Infrastructures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.3 WSN Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1.3.1 Terrestrial WSN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1.3.2 Underground WSN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1.3.3 Underwater WSN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1.3.4 Mobile WSN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1.3.5 Multi-Media WSN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1.4 Factors Influencing WSN Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1.4.1 Fault Tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1.4.2 Scalability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1.4.3 Production Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1.4.4 Dynamic Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1.4.5 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1.4.6 Data Aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1.4.7 Energy Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1.5 Operating Systems for WSNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1.5.1 TinyOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1.5.2 SOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1.5.3 Contiki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1.5.4 LiteOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1.6 Protocol Stack for WSN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 1.6.1 Task Management Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 1.6.2 Connection Management Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 1.6.3 Power Management Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 1.6.4 Application Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 1.6.5 Transport Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 1.6.6 Network (or Routing) Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1.6.7 Data Link Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1.6.8 Physical Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1.7 Communication Standards for WSN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 1.7.1 ZigBee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 1.7.2 Bluetooth and Bluetooth Low Energy . . . . . . . . . 20 1.7.3 Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) . . . . . . . . . 21 1.8 Security in WSNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 1.8.1 Security Constraints in WSN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 1.8.2 Security Requirements in WSN . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 1.8.3 Attacks Against WSNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 1.9 Major Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 1.9.1 Routing Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 1.9.2 Security of Data Aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 1.9.3 Location Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 1.9.4 Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 2 Intrusion Detection Systems and Game Theory for WSNs 30 2.1 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) for WSNs . . . . . . . . . 32 2.1.1 Intrusion Detection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 2.1.2 Motivation of Intrusion Detection in WSNs . . . . . . . 32 2.1.3 Detection Methodologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 2.1.4 IDS Architectures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.1.5 IDS Architectures for WSN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 2.1.6 Literature Review Based on WSNs . . . . . . . . . . . 40 2.1.7 IDS Assessment Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 2.2 Game Theory for WSN Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 2.2.1 Basics of Game Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 2.2.2 Motivation to Use Game Theory in Intrusion Detection 45 2.2.3 Game Theory Types for WSNs Security . . . . . . . . 46 2.2.4 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 II A Game Theoretic Approach for Securing AODV in WSN 51 3 Analysis and Design 52 3.1 Ad-hoc on Demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol (AODV) 53 3.1.1 Control Messages in AODV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 3.1.2 Route Discovery Mechanism in AODV . . . . . . . . . 55 3.1.3 Route Maintenance in AODV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 3.2 Black Hole Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 3.3 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 3.4 Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 3.4.1 AODV-GameTheoretic Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 3.4.2 Performance Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4 Implementation and Experimental Results 70 4.1 Development Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 4.1.1 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 4.1.2 Network Simulator 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 4.2 Implementing a New Routing Protocol to Simulate Black Hole Attack . . . 73 4.3 Examining the Blackhole AODV Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . 75 4.3.1 Simulation Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 4.3.2 Simulation Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 4.3.3 Testing Trace File and Evaluating Results . . . . . . . 78 4.4 Implementing AODV-GT Protocol Against Blackhole Attack . 81 4.5 Examining The AODV-GT Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 4.5.1 Evaluating Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 General Conclusion 90 |
| Type de document : | Mémoire master |
Disponibilité (1)
| Cote | Support | Localisation | Statut |
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| MINF/574 | Mémoire master | bibliothèque sciences exactes | Consultable |
